On Dec 9, 2008, Thailand announced a policy to formalize the status of Burmese migrants working in Thailand through nationality verification (NV) program. Most NGO activists rolled their eyes, believing the government was unrealistically setting its sights on finding a “solution” to illegal migration by Burmese.

Around 3 million Burmese migrants are currently in Thailand. Despite Ministry of Interior residence status and Ministry of Labour “legal” permission to work, they entered Thailand illegally and remain, paradoxically, “illegal, pending deportation.”

Periodic news reports suggest Burmese migrants cause all kinds of problems for the nation: crime, disease and job losses. Officially, Thailand attaches importance to the rights of all migrant workers and recognizes their contribution to the labour market.

The nationality verification program had been talked about for 10 years. A Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed by Burma and Thailand on June 21, 2003, but the process never became a reality.

But NV is now underway. Six NV centers are operational on both sides of three main Burma-Thailand border crossings, two more are planned, and reports are circulating of migrants travelling back to Burma and returning with temporary Burmese passports and Thai two-year visas. Discussion should now be moved beyond whether to conduct the NV process to how to conduct it most effectively.

NV is close to a migrant’s worst nightmare. NV hits migrants where it hurts in two ways: first, the cost, and second, the potential danger—migrants are required to deal with their “enemy,” a genuinely scary experience for ethnic minorities in Burma, where many communities are still at war with the junta.

The Thai government has done just about everything it can to make the NV process as obscure, un-transparent and costly as possible: no public relations campaign for migrants, labor organizations or NGOs (and also very little for employers and government officials), failure to regulate brokers (with prices from US $100 to US $300) that seem particularly inappropriate given that migrant worker incomes are so low.

The only official information provided on NV appears to be a leaflet provided by the Burmese government that tells migrants (who illegally left Burma and have little faith in the junta) that the process is risk free, cheap and friendly.

And then there are the rumors that surround the migrant community: land confiscation for families of migrant workers remaining in Burma, 60 (or 200, depending on who you speak to) migrants from Bangkok arrested on arriving in Myawaddy, Burma,  to process their NV papers and sent to Insein Prison, extortion, even rumors of migrants committing suicide to avoid NV. The Thai and Burmese governments came together on Oct.12 to deny such rumors, but officials carry some blame for allowing the process to become so secretive. Who are the brokers? How is nationality verified and how long does it take? What are the benefits? Why are some applications approved slowly and some quickly? Why are Muslims excluded? Why won’t Burma allow the process to take place in Thailand, as it did for Laotian and Cambodian migrants? Is NV somehow related to the 2010 elections in Burma? 

Finding a solution to illegal migration when you share a long land border with a country that is underdeveloped, corrupt and un-democratic is a task even the most developed countries in the world would find difficult. But even judged by this standard, Thailand seems to be doing a particularly bad job.

Migration is a natural phenomenon whereby human beings move to find something better for themselves and their families, something different or challenging for their lives, or because conflict threatens their safety.

Since the early 1990s, Thailand has implemented a piece-meal migrant registration policy, at first limited to certain provinces and sectors. The haphazard approach involved issuing a cabinet resolution, granting an amnesty, a temporary migrant registration window, and very limited public relations campaign. It was not unusual for officials at the Ministry of Labour to hear about a new registration processes only after it had begun, and migrants and employers were often unaware of the program before it finished for another year.

The crux of the Burmese migrant challenge stems from one crucial point: the migrants left their homeland illegally (and are subject to imprisonment should they return and be convicted), and then entered Thailand illegally or overstayed their border pass.

They entered Thailand illegally or overstayed their welcome because there was no workable MoU between Thailand and Burma. An abundance of brokers are there to help them illegally cross into Thailand, at a cost. And the Thai economy is currently heavily dependent on their labor, in mostly low paying jobs.