Burma's 'Fire' and 'Water' Foreign Policy Stymies Diplomacy

Burma’s supreme leader Than Shwe holds "fire" in one hand and "water" in the other. Don’t think the junta chief is playing martial arts, like in the Chinese movies he loves to watch.

Let’s call it the junta's "fire and water" foreign policy.

The junta chief, who used to work in the psychological warfare department, practices his policy by dividing his officers into two groups: "fire," comprised of fiery hard-liners, and "water," comprised of soft-spoken officers. 

It’s time for everyone, especially world leaders and diplomats, to take a serious look at Burma's foreign policy, which for almost two decades has managed to manipulate whatever policies the West comes up with to try to move the regime towards democracy and national reconciliation.

Diplomacy seems to be more crucial than ever to help solve Burma’s crisis, since pro-active, violent means, including nationwide uprisings and armed struggles, have proved ineffective.

For the international community, diplomacy seems to be the only way to tackle Burma’s crisis. The diplomacy route is what all countries advocate, from the West to the regime's more vocal supporters, such as China and most of its Asean neighbors. 

The regime's clever "fire and water" tactic to fend off the diplomatic efforts of its critics was on display at the junta’s press conference in Naypyidaw on Monday.

One of Than Shwe's right-hand men, Brig-Gen Kyaw Hsan, the information minister, ruled out any role for detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi in the drafting of a new constitution of the military government, even though the international community, including China, has called for an inclusive process in writing the constitution and in national reconciliation.

“No assistance or advice from other persons is required,” said the minister. That's the fire.

Now, for the water. In the same conference, the government’s liaison officer, ex-Gen Aung Kyi, considered "good in dealing with foreign diplomats, said, “We have made progress at the meetings,” referring to his three meetings with Suu Kyi, supposedly to discuss national reconciliation.

Such "hard" and "soft" messages are ambiguous, at best, and muddy up the analysis made by foreign diplomats, further confusing and blurring the idea of progress or lack of progress.

In early November when UN envoy Ibrahim Gambari visited Burma, he was lectured by information minister Kyaw Hsan.
 
The information minister told Gambari: “Your Excellency should seriously pay attention to the fact that the government and the entire people are expecting your visit to be constructive for the nation and the people. However, your previous visit did not bear fruit as we had expected. The presidential statement of UN Security Council, the further sanctions of the US and EU, the sanction of Australia, etc., sowed suspicions on your efforts among some of our people.”

The statement was reported by the junta’s mouthpiece newspapers. Many Burma observers, including diplomats, said the speech was “patronizing.”
 
The minister added, “If you bring along the instructions of the leaders of a big power and demands of internal and external anti-government groups, it will in no way contribute towards the seeking of solutions to Myanmar’s [Burma's] affairs. It will rather increase the existing suspicions of the people.”

On the other hand, the story was different on the next day when Gambari met Prime Minister Gen Thein Sein. According to inside sources close to the government, Thein Sein spoke with a softer tone to the envoy. Thein Sein invited Gambari to visit again a few weeks later to continue his efforts for national reconciliation. 

In retrospect, Burma’s governments have frequently preferred to craft foreign policy in a bilateral way since it gained its independence from British rule in 1948. During that period, Burmese governments concentrated on neutralism and a non-aligned policy, especially during the Cold War era.
 
Months before forming Asean in 1967, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines persuaded the then Burmese government to join the imminent grouping. Late dictator Ne Win's government turned down the proposal later, saying that Burma couldn’t join the grouping as long as the member countries allowed foreign troops to be based on their soil. The dictator especially referred to its neighbor Thailand, which allowed US military bases.

However, the successor military regime that deposed him in 1988 viewed its foreign policy differently after the 1990 election, when the opposition National League for Democracy party, led by detained pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi, won the elections in a landslide.    

To nullify the election results, the military regime desperately tried to establish its legitimacy through the regional organization, Asean.